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INTRODUCTION
Law and rhetoric have always been connected. Their roots go back to the
Classical period wherein facility in law and rhetoric were necessary citizenship
skills for advocacy in the polis.1 As a result, instruction in rhetoric and law
went hand in hand. Over time though that close connection began to wane as
forces like religion began to replace rhetoric as a primary discourse source,
which ultimately resulted in law and rhetoric viewed as separate rather than
* Mark A. Hannah is an Associate Professor of English at Arizona State University. Susie
Salmon is the Director of Legal Writing and Clinical Professor of Law at the University of
Arizona.
1 Malthon Anapol, Rhetoric and Law: An Overview, 18 COMM. Q. 12, 12 (1970); see also
GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN & SECULAR TRADITION FROM
ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 4 (2d ed. 1999); Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking
Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 110 (1993).
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mutually informing disciplines.2 Of late, there have been efforts to restore law
and rhetoric’s close connection in legal education.3 A primary focus of these
efforts was to provide lawyers tools and vocabulary to recognize the value and
potential application of rhetoric in their work.4 These efforts have been successful in establishing rhetoric’s value in improving the development of lawyers’
reasoning and writing skills, yet they do not offer a comprehensive account of
rhetoric in law. More specifically, rhetoric has been brought back to law only in
part through descriptive practice and application of well-known rhetorical concepts such as ethos, pathos, and logos as well as through efforts to articulate
writing as a process and attend to audience, purpose, and context.5 What has
been missing from the restorative efforts is attention to some of rhetoric’s more
complex concepts that demonstrate rhetoric’s constitutive capacity and how it
creates and shapes conditions for action in everyday life. We argue that such
attention to these complex concepts is an important step towards expanding and
strengthening law and rhetoric’s close connection.
In this Article, we make the case for dissent writing and reasoning as the
vehicle for fully restoring rhetoric and law’s connection. We see dissents as superior tools for talking about and examining the close relationship between law
and rhetoric, because as a genre, dissents invite working with and closely scrutinizing law’s systemic nature, its inherent instability and uncertainty, and the
surpluses that emanate from legal texts as they work their way through law’s
system.6 Rather than seeing such instability and uncertainty as barriers to effective communication, rhetoric sees these items as fruitful resources for developing reasoning and effective advocacy.7 Put simply, dissents make visible rheto-

2

Anapol, supra note 1, at 15.
See sources cited infra notes 10, 21, 23, 25, and 26.
4 Kristen K. Robbins-Tiscione, A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the
Legal Writing Classroom, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 319, 319 (2011).
5 Michael H. Frost, With Amici Like These: Cicero, Quintilian and the Importance of Stylistic Demeanor, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 5, 9 (2006) [hereinafter Frost, Stylistic
Demeanor]; Kristen Robbins Tiscione, Aristotle’s Tried and True Recipe for Argument Casserole, 15 PERSPS.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 45, 48 (2006) [hereinafter Tiscione,
Aristotle]; Kristen K. Tiscione, How the Disappearance of Classical Rhetoric and the Decision to Teach Law as a “Science” Severed Theory from Practice in Legal Education, 51
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 391 (2016) [hereinafter Tiscione, Disappearance].
6 LIEF H. CARTER & THOMAS F. BURKE, REASON IN LAW 86–87 (9th ed. 2016); JAMES BOYD
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 237 (Abridged ed. 1985); Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca
Johnson, Ten Theses on Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 156, 165 (2017).
7 Kristine M. Bartanen, The Rhetoric of Dissent in Justice O’Connor’s Akron Opinion,
SOUTHERN SPEECH COMM. J. 240, 244 (1987); Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law
as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 7 (2010) [hereinafter Berger,
Studying]; Robert L. Ivie, Enabling Democratic Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 46, 46 (2015);
Erin J. Rand, Fear the Frill: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Uncertain Futurity of Feminist
Judicial Dissent, 101 Q.J. SPEECH 72, 76 (2015).
3
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ric’s constitutive nature as a discipline that fundamentally creates and invents
rather than merely adorns.8
Admittedly, working with dissents may seem counter-intuitive to readers;
after all, dissents are legally impotent at the time of their composition. They
represent anti-majority reasoning and work against the grain of the majority
opinion. As such, in the moments following their creation, dissents have constrained potential as precedents for shaping law.9 However, it is in this very
space of working against the grain that dissents’ promise lies for reestablishing
rhetoric and law’s close connection. When examining dissents, we argue that
law students are exposed to the complex rhetorical concepts that create conditions for a dissent’s future success. As such, dissents are unique discursive tools
for heightening and making visible rhetoric and law’s close connection across
the law school curriculum.
I.

WHY RHETORIC?

Although rhetoric seems to be at the heart of the lawyer’s craft—after all,
using communication to persuade is the lawyer’s stock in trade—rhetoric often
receives very little explicit attention in the law school curriculum. Modern legal
educators often implicitly teach rhetoric but fail to do so intentionally or expressly.10 This disconnect is not a new development; the relationship between
rhetoric and legal education long has been a turbulent one. In the Classical period in Greece and Rome, lawyers studied rhetoric along with “law, politics,
history, poetry, and oratory.”11 Indeed, “in Greece[,] theories of rhetoric were
developed largely for speakers in the lawcourts . . . .”12 Over the years, however, education in rhetoric shifted away from analyzing how to devise and construct a sound, logical argument and evolved instead to focus largely on style
and delivery.13
Against this historical background, U.S. legal education faced a fork in the
road at the end of the 1800s.14 Curricula at many of the first U.S. law schools
included explicit instruction in rhetoric.15 Legal educators valued training in
8

See Amanda C. Bryan & Eve M. Ringsmuth, Jeremiad or Weapon of Words?, 4 J.L. &
CTS. 159, 161 (2016).
9 See Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 161; J. Louis Campbell, III, The Spirit of Dissent, 66 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 304, 306 (1983); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010).
10 See Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal
Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861, 861 (1995); Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 109.
11 See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 391–92.
12 KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 4–5.
13 Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 110 (“The separation of law from rhetoric occurred
during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance at about the same time that rhetoric came to
mean the art of oratorical eloquence distinct from the science of logic and dialectic.”).
14 Id. at 111.
15 Id. at 110. Students at Columbia Law School, for example, read Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Id.
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rhetoric, urging law students to become familiar with its principles and practices.16 Notably, in the late 1800s, Yale Law School was moving toward a more
practical model of legal education, animated by a rhetorical theory of lawyering.17 At the same time, however, the Langdellian revolution hit Harvard; law
schools began to see law as an empirical science comprised of concrete and
certain rules susceptible to discovery through the rational, systematic analysis
of court opinions.18 Under the Langdellian model, rhetoric, with its focus on
persuasion and probability rather than discovery of the one true law, became
viewed as nonrational—a “failed science”—and antithetical to the goals of the
method.19 The “case method” quickly dominated legal pedagogy, and Yale’s
approach—and its explicit instruction in rhetorical theory and methods—
virtually disappeared from law school curricula for the next hundred-plus
years.20
In recent years, however, legal scholars—in particular, legal-writing scholars—have exhorted legal educators to revive explicit instruction in rhetorical
theory and practices across the law school curriculum.21 Teaching students to
recognize the inextricable relationship between rhetoric and law can only enrich their understanding and appreciation of law and the lawyer’s role. Law
isn’t, in fact, a hard science. “True law” is no concrete entity that students can
discover through investigation but the product of fallible humans engaged in
and influenced by persuasive techniques.22 Making transparent the rhetorical
nature of law can help dissolve many law students’ fixed notions of some
mythical “ball” of black-letter law that their doctrinal professors are somehow
“hiding” through the Socratic method.23 Rhetoric also can serve as a unifying
theory that creates coherence in the law school curriculum and breaks down
subject-matter silos by drawing clear connections between theory and practice,
and thus responds to calls in the Carnegie Report and other critiques of contemporary legal education for more integrative teaching models.24
16

Id. at 110–11.
Id. at 111.
18 Id.; Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 395–96.
19 See Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 113–14.
20 Id. at 111.
21 See, e.g., Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 7; Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against
the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 164 (1993);
Neil Feigenson, Legal Writing Texts Today, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 506 (1991) (book reviews); Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 861–62, 865–67; Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089, 1092 (1986).
22 See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 395, 397 (quoting Edward Rubin, What’s
Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 636, 649
(2007)) (“The case method . . . perpetuates the idea that law exists ‘out there’ for [students]
to discover. . . . Yet law—encompassing statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions—is a
social construct, and the study of law is ‘the study of human beings, with all the complexity,
normativity, and subjectivity that this study necessarily implies.’ ”).
23 See Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at 319.
24
See Tiscione, Disappearance, supra note 5, at 398–99.
17
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Both the benefits and the means of intentional instruction in rhetoric seem
clearer in the context of the legal-writing classroom. Law students often learn
persuasive legal writing in their second semesters, and many legal-writing texts
and curricula incorporate at least some explicit discussion of rhetoric, even if
just a glancing mention of logos, ethos, and pathos.25 Introducing students to
Cicero’s six-part arrangement prepares students for the common components of
a legal brief.26 Instruction in Aristotle’s canons of composition provides students with a process for researching, brainstorming, writing, and arguing an appellate brief.27 Lacing rhetorical theory throughout the traditional legal-writing
instruction in constructing legal arguments and preparing legal documents
couches best practices in a context, which likely enhances transfer of learning.28 An understanding of deductive reasoning and syllogism helps students
accept more quickly the IRAC/CREAC organizational paradigm taught in most
legal writing courses, helping erode students’ usual resistance to the constraints
of what they initially see as a stifling formula, and this acceptance can only
lead to better, more coherent writing.29 Students likely expect to encounter instruction in rhetorical theory in this context,30 and introducing it makes legal
writing instruction more intellectually stimulating for both professor and student.31
But rhetoric instruction—like writing instruction—truly belongs “across
the curriculum” in legal education.32 Imagine a Professional Responsibility
25

See, e.g., Barbara P. Blumenfeld, Rhetoric, Referential Communication, and the Novice
Writer, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 207, 207 (2012) (“Classical rhetoric is a useful and integral part of legal writing instruction at many law schools.”); Robbins-Tiscione,
supra note 4, at 325 (“My course is structured around Aristotle’s canons of rhetoric.”). For
example, a number of legal-writing professors across the country routinely use Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail to introduce law students to Aristotle’s
Modes of Persuasion and other principles of Classical rhetoric when they introduce persuasive legal writing. See, e.g., Mark DeForrest, Introducing Persuasive Legal Argument via the
Letter from a Birmingham City Jail, 15 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 109, 110 (2009); Suzanne
Rabe, Presentation at the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the Legal Writing Institute: From
Aristotle to Martin Luther King: Using Letter from Birmingham Jail to Teach Aristotle’s
Three Modes of Persuasion (Atlanta, Ga., June 8, 2006) (on file with author).
26 E.g., Frost, Stylistic Demeanor, supra note 5, at 9 (“the Greco-Roman six-part structure of
legal argument has survived virtually intact to the present day.”); Tiscione, Aristotle, supra
note 5, at 48 (noting that the Rhetorical ad Herennium, a well-known Roman treatise on
rhetoric, divided argument into six parts that mirror the parts of a typical modern legal memorandum or brief, and that Cicero and Quintillian adopted these parts as well).
27 See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 118–21; Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at
325–37.
28 See Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 4, at 319.
29 Id. at 329.
30 See id. at 324 (“I find my first-year law students expect me to teach them about logic and
emotional appeals—two aspects of rhetoric with which they are rarely familiar—because
they intuit their relevance to legal education.”).
31 See id. at 327–28.
32 See, e.g., Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that “[l]egal education will
benefit by taking a rhetorical approach to teaching students to think like lawyers.”); James
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class animated by a discussion of ethos, of Cicero’s conception of the effective
orator as first and foremost a “good man,” and of Quintilian’s recognition that
the best advocate is the “good and even-tempered person.” Or imagine a doctrinal class where the professor transparently addressed the legal texts as responses to particular rhetorical situations. Many law students struggle with critical reading, a skill essential to their success in the classroom and the
profession.33 Early class or orientation sessions animated by the principles of
New Rhetoric could welcome new law students to this new discourse community and make explicit the connections between legal reading and legal communication, perhaps helping students read legal authorities more skeptically rather than being “seduced” by them.34
Moreover, weaving explicit instruction in rhetoric throughout the law
school curriculum can only enhance law-student and lawyer well-being across
many dimensions.35 Introducing law students to Cicero’s conception of the effective lawyer as a well-rounded human being encourages students to nurture
the interests that they brought with them to law school and to develop new
ones. But perhaps most importantly, encouraging students to see law as a rhetorical practice rather than a quest for some essential, definable legal truth empowers them and gives them agency. In contrast with the fatalistic views of legal formalism and legal realism, which in their traditional forms suggest that
“rules” or “politics” inevitably dictate the results of any case, and thus lawyers
serve as mere conduits for those preordained outcomes, a rhetorical point of
view sees lawyers as “human actors whose work makes a difference because
they are the readers, writers, and members of interpretive and compositional
communities who together ‘constitute’ the law.”36 Instruction in New Rhetoric
allows students to see their writing not just as a means to communicate information, but as a mode for creating knowledge and for deepening their own un-

Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 685 (1985) (“How can it be that law was ever regarded as anything
but rhetoric?”); see also sources cited supra note 21.
33 See Debra Moss Curtis & Judith R. Karp, “In a Case, in a Book, They Will Not Take a
Second Look!” Critical Reading in the Legal Writing Classroom, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
293, 294 (2005) (observing that, although critical reading is a “core lawyering skill,” many
law students fail to engage actively with the material they read); Jane Bloom Grise, Critical
Reading Instruction: The Road to Successful Legal Writing Skills, 18 W. MICH. COOLEY J.
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 259, 261–62 (2017) (noting that many incoming law students “have not
been exposed to the critical reading skills that are necessary for law school success,” although studies suggest that “critical reading skills may be key to law school success.”); Carolyn V. Williams, #CriticalReading #WickedProblem, 44 S. Ill. U. L.J. 179, 181 (2020)
(characterizing the lack of critical reading skills among incoming law students as a “wicked
problem” that all stakeholders in legal education—not just legal-writing professors—must
recognize and address to promote student success in law school and in the profession).
34 See Fajans & Falk, supra note 21, at 163.
35 Exploring this thesis in more depth is outside the scope of this article but fruitful ground
for a future piece.
36
Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 8–9.
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derstanding.37 Increasing student comfort with the appropriateness of emotional
appeals—Aristotle’s pathos—may help mitigate some of the ills associated
with the otherwise logos-dominated legal reasoning in which law students are
typically indoctrinated.38 Rhetoric arms students with weapons to lawyer “outside the box,” and supplies them with tools to challenge and dismantle unfavorable precedent to craft solutions for their clients and advocate for changes in
unjust or outdated legal rules.39 And deepening law students’ understanding of
rhetoric—enabling them to see it as more than a collection of stylistic tricks
and instead as the very definition of “thinking like a lawyer” in all its transformative complexity—allows students to rediscover and deploy talents, interests, values, personal experiences, and other parts of themselves that traditional
legal education often stifles and devalues.40 Indeed, teaching law as rhetoric
welcomes law students into a distinctly human endeavor that connects individuals across the boundaries of time and culture.41
A. Rhetoric in the Law School Classroom Now
Increasingly—and particularly with the explosion of legal-writing programs in the last twenty-plus years—explicit instruction in rhetoric has found
its way back into at least some law school classrooms.42 Many legal-writing
texts, particularly more advanced ones focused on persuasive technique, incorporate explicit references to the lessons of Classical rhetoric.43 And, unsurprisingly, some legal-writing texts introduce students to various rhetorical devices
and illustrate them with examples from contemporary legal briefs.44
37

See Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 156–57 (1999) [hereinafter
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric].
38 See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 8 (“In their traditional guises, formalism and realism appear to doom lawyers to lives of ‘quiet desperation’: if ‘rules’ or ‘politics’ compel
outcomes, the work of lawyers will have little effect. Rhetoric recognizes a constructive role
. . . [f]rom the rhetorical point of view, . . . lawyers are human actors whose work makes a
difference . . . .”).
39 See id.
40 See id. at 63–64 (“Students appreciate being able to draw upon the things they carried
with them into law school that they thought were unwelcome in law school.”).
41 See id. at 64 (“Rhetorical analysis shows us that ‘law is a human exercise; that it is driven
neither by immutable truths . . . nor by arbitrary whims.’ Isn’t it ironic that after teaching
students how to think like lawyers, we must remind them that they will be practicing law as
human beings?”) (citations omitted).
42 Blumenfeld, supra note 25, at 207 n.1 (observing that “there is a movement to heavily
integrate rhetoric as the primary focus and structure of legal writing courses.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 21 and 32.
43 See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN
PERSUASIVE WRITING 9 (2d ed. 2008); KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR
LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 17 (2d ed.
2009).
44 See, e.g., ANNE ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR,
PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER 160 (2d ed. 2005).

20 NEV. L.J. 935

942

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:3

Arguably, principles of New Rhetoric have animated the curricula of most
legal writing programs since their earliest days; legal-writing professors have
implemented a process-over-product approach since at least the early 1980s and
explicitly focus on audience, purpose, and convention.45 Select law schools
even include entire courses in Law as Rhetoric, often taught by a legal-writing
professor.46 But, at this point in the history of legal education, any explicit instruction in rhetoric seems to remain almost exclusively in the legal-writing
classroom.47
B. Dissents in Law and Rhetoric
Historically, dissent writing produced much anxiety within the legal community due to expressed concerns about the anticipated costs that dissent writing would have on legal practice, such as an increase in politicization of courts
and their decisions, the creation of uncertainty and indeterminacy in law, and a
diminishment of collegiality between judges sitting on multi-member courts.48
The fact that dissents are of no legal consequence only underscored much of
this anxiety.49 Dissents were “loser law,” after all, and were believed to unnecessarily disrupt the stability and legitimacy of the legal system.50 However,
45

Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 37, at 165–66; Robbins-Tiscione, supra note
4, at 324 (“Legal writing pedagogy today typically accounts for the individual writer’s process, the legal audience, and, to some extent, the generative aspects of writing.”).
46 See, e.g., Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 7, 15–21 (describing the upper-level elective
“Law & Rhetoric” course Berger developed and has taught at two different law schools).
Notably, Berger has the students read and analyze at least one dissent in her course; it appears that she primarily uses it to illustrate how differing rhetorical choices in the dissent and
majority opinion enable different outcomes.
47 Perhaps, as Kristin Tiscione posited back in 2006, this reflects the propensity of doctrinal
law professors to see themselves as engaged in a search for “truth,” and that they “conceptualize the search for truth as an exclusively philosophical endeavor” rather than at least partially a rhetorical one. Kristen Konrad Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education:
Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 125 (2006).
48 Peter W. Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, Why Judges Should Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 126,
134–36 (2017); see also Jeffrey L. Courtright, “I Respectfully Dissent”: The Ethics of Dissent in Justice O’Connor’s Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC Opinion, in WARRANTING
ASSENT: CASE STUDIES IN ARGUMENT EVALUATION 125 (Edward Schiappa ed., 1995); Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. L.J. 167, 173 (2002–03) [hereinafter Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent]; Rand, supra note 7, at 81; Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of
Judicial Dissent, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 919, 920 (2012); Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to
Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100
CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1461–63 (2012).
49 William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 429 (1986) (“dissent[s] [are] . . . a ‘cloud’ on the majority decision . . . .”); Courtright, supra note 48, at 130;
Rand, supra note 7, at 73.
50 Bartanen, supra note 7, at 244; Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 165 (Belleau and
Johnson write “[t]he tension between stability and change, between certainty and responsiveness, is one of the great and unavoidable tensions in law.”); Rand, supra note 7, at 79.
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over time, this anxiety began to wane due in part to shifts in the make-up of
courts (i.e., more judges willing to dissent).51 Furthermore, lawyers and scholars began reconceptualizing the kinds of work dissents perform (e.g., their being theorized as acts of institutional disobedience)52 as well as the recognition
that they can draw more attention, in particular from the media, and speak to
broader public audiences than majority opinions.53 In both examples, we see
the legal community begin to recognize dissents as having untapped constitutive potential54 as available means of persuasion, which for the purposes of this
Article, demonstrates their value as an object of analysis for heightening law
and rhetoric’s close connection in the contemporary practice of law.
Before turning our attention to this potential, we want to provide background information about the “genre of dissent,” or how dissents have been
theorized and discussed in the fields of law and rhetoric.55 In what follows, we
discuss dissents’ roles and purposes as well as the nature of dissents’ voices
and how they address multiple audiences.
1. Dissents’ Roles and Purposes
Though they lack formal, legal significance at the time of their composition, dissents do important work that both affirms the rule of law yet simultaneously challenges the law to be better and more responsive to present day facts
and circumstances. Legal scholars and practitioners have described dissents’
work in terms of a duality or as a double gesture. That is, dissents both disrupt
and affirm, and they serve as a balancing point between stability and change in
the law.56 To describe the complexity of this dual work in an accessible manner, scholars and practitioners have identified specific roles and purposes that
dissents serve. For example, dissents have been recognized as playing a safeguard role, as holding judges accountable to the rule of law, and as making
their reasoning and thinking transparent.57 Key features of dissents’ accountability role are their work in identifying errors,58 demonstrating flaws in reason51

Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 1–2.
Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 306 (noting that dissents appeal to controlling law).
53 Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 174–75; Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 6.
54 Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 26; Maurice Charland, Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case
of the Peuple Québécois, 73 Q.J. SPEECH 133, 141 (1987); Ivie, supra note 7, at 47; Rand,
supra note 7, at 73.
55 Bartanen, supra note 7, at 242 (noting that dissents have not received much scholarly attention).
56 Ivie, supra note 7, at 46; Rand, supra note 7, at 73 (explaining that dissents are “of the
law and in excess of the law . . . .”).
57 Bartanen, supra 7, at 247; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Sonia Sotomayor & Linda
Greenhouse, A Conversation with Justice Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 375, 376 (2014).
58 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION,
METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: AN INTERPRETATION 68 (1928). Famously, Chief Justice
Hughes wrote that dissents are “an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissent52
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ing,59 and emphasizing perceived limits of the majority decision.60 A less visible feature of this accountability is how dissents function as “soft threats” during the period in which briefs are circulated internally between judges on multimember courts before a majority opinion is announced.61
Concurrent with their accountability function aimed at affirming the rule of
law, dissents also point the way forward for changing the law and offer instruction to other courts for pursuing this path.62 In such signaling work, dissents
function as change agents. Specifically, they are invitations to revision that reframe the issue at hand and invite audiences to reimagine other future possibilities for the law.63 The rhetorical force of a dissent’s appeal to the future is its
creation of discursive space for thinking and writing to occur over time. Such
space holds open and creates conditions for conversation to remain open, for
the points of contention to be publicized, and for other non-legal public participants to contribute to the framing and discussion of the issue at hand.64
In creating a holding space and maintaining legal uncertainty, dissents intentionally act against law’s desire for stability by inviting into conversation the
politics that law strives to exclude.65 Through connecting law and policy, dissents seek to exploit the persuasive capacities of non-legal texts and ideas circulating outside of the law’s closed discourse system. In particular, dissents
draw on these extra-legal discursive resources as vehicles for pointing out incongruences or perceived variances between existing law and evolving societal
ing judge believes the court to have been betrayed.” Id.; Bartanen, supra note 7, at 247;
Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Catherine L. Langford, Appealing to the Brooding Spirit
of the Law: Good and Evil in Landmark Judicial Dissents, 44 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC.
119, 119 (2008); Wood, supra note 48, at 1454.
59 Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173.
60 Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Courtright, supra note 48, at 136; Wood, supra note
48, at 1455.
61 Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1479,
1484–87 (2012) (describing the use of soft threats in a process of “adversarial collaboration”); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 609 (1994); Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 3 (describing
dissents as an invitation to majority writers “to refine and clarify”).
62 Bartanen, supra note 7, at 262; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430; Bryan & Ringsmuth,
supra note 8, at 162; Courtright, supra note 48, at 136; Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note
48, at 173; Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent, 12 JAMES COOK U. L. REV. 4, 8 (2005); Wood,
supra note 48, at 1456.
63 Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 173–74; Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307;
Courtright, supra note 48, at 136 (“[D]issenting arguments function rhetorically to engage
audiences in the consideration of propositions that the dissenter apparently deems worthy of
public consideration.”) (citations omitted); Katie L. Gibson, In Defense of Women’s Rights:
A Rhetorical Analysis of Judicial Dissent, 35 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 123, 129 (2012); Tiho
Mijatov, How to Use a Dissent, 9 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 69, 76 (2015); Rand, supra note 7, at
82; Wood, supra note 48, at 1447 (referring to the process of reimagining as an act of “reshuffl[ing]”).
64 Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 163; Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 160; Rand,
supra note 7, at 78.
65
Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 306; Rand, supra note 7, at 73.
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norms and law’s inability to respond to them.66 Ultimately, in bringing politics
within the realm of legal discourse, dissents function as a democratic supplement and promote the ideals set forth in the Constitution.67
2. Dissents’ Voice and Audience Simultaneity
The defining feature of a dissent’s voice is that it is the voice of an advocate.68 Unconstrained by concerns of comporting with precedent or forwarding
stability within the legal system, the voice of the dissent initiates change and
begins a new conversation that sounds a “call for corrective action.”69 In initiating such change, a dissent’s voice is decidedly deliberative and operates in its
holding space with an eye to the future.70 When addressing the future and the
desirability of law’s attendant change, the tone or style of a dissent’s advocacy
can take on a range of characteristics. For example, the voice has been described as emotionally laden,71 yet heroic and prescient.72 Furthermore, it has
been noted as aspirational in its aim to carve out perceptions of what should be
through adopting both a skeptical, stipulative position and committing itself to
directed acts of questioning, interrupting, and advising.73 Together, each of
these ways of describing the advocacy of the dissent reveals the unique, idiosyncratic nature a dissent takes on through the motivated perspective of its author responding to the particular facts and circumstances underlying an unfavorable judicial outcome.74 It is an open and resolute voice, one that does not
require itself to be harmonized with the voice of the majority opinion.75 However, to be successful, the advocate’s voice must work to develop some form of
66

Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 430, 432; Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 212–13 (2003); Bartanen, supra note 7,
at 247; Rand, supra note 7, at 77.
68 Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 37, at 173 (noting concerns with students developing their own voices and being able to initiate conversations in their writing); Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 308. Please note in the Implementation section of this article, we
will discuss the opportunities dissents offer for helping students work through the challenge
of developing a voice in their writing. Mijatov, supra note 63, at 74; see also Mark K. Osbeck, What is “Good Legal Writing” and Why Does It Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 417, 444
(2012).
69 Ivie, supra note 7, at 50.
70 Gibson, supra note 63, at 134; Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 48, at 138; Rand, supra
note 7, at 77. Please note dissents also have an epideictic function in that they praise and/or
blame a majority opinion.
71 Bryan & Ringsmuth, supra note 8, at 161.
72 ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN THE
SUPREME COURT 14 (1974); Langford, supra note 58, at 119–20; Mijatov, supra note 63, at
79; Rand, supra note 7, at 76.
73 Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307; Gibson, supra note 63, at 135; Ivie, supra note 7, at
50; Langford, supra note 58, at 120.
74 Bartanen, supra note 7, at 245.
75 See Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 160; Courtright, supra note 48, at 141; Frost,
Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 174.
67
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shared language with the public audiences to which it communicates.76 That is,
the dissent must deploy terms of convergence to legitimize the critical perspective set forth in the dissent and also reorient the audience to the dissent’s desired ends.77
The challenge of providing vocabulary to a dissent’s audience is the simultaneity of that audience. That is, a dissent writer composes a dissent with an eye
towards addressing a variety of internal and external audiences who have potential influence over the mechanisms for forwarding a dissent’s goals.78 These
audiences range from current and future judges, to lawyers working both within
and outside of the case in which a dissent originates, to legislatures that can develop laws, to administrative agencies that can issue regulations, relative to the
issue generating dissent, and to citizens who have a vested or potential interest
in the issue at hand.79 Dissent writers signal to all of these audiences simultaneously, working to cultivate them to the writer’s proposition for the future by inviting them to overhear and bear witness to a disagreement.80 Ultimately, because of this simultaneity, dissents are best understood as genres of public
rhetoric, documents written for change that require broad engagement from a
range of legal and non-legal stakeholders.81 The holding space in which a dissent operates creates a public82 forum for these stakeholders to unite, deliberate,
and develop advocacy strategies for actualizing the dissent’s goals.
C. The Opportunity for Dissent Pedagogy in Law
Beyond Belleau and Johnson’s “Ten Theses on Dissent,”83 there is limited
scholarship directly addressing the pedagogical promise of dissents. Much
scholarship about legal pedagogy focuses on the use or usefulness of the Socratic method, or both.84 Yet, as has been noted repeatedly, the Socratic method
76

For discussions of the importance of shared language development in professional contexts see Mark A. Hannah, Objects of O2: A Posthuman Analysis of Differentiated Language
Use in a Cross-Disciplinary Research Partnership, in POSTHUMAN PRAXIS IN TECHNICAL
COMMUNICATION 217 (Kristen R. Moore & Daniel P. Richards eds., 2018); Ariel D. Anbar et
al., Bridge the Planetary Divide, 539 NATURE 25, 27 (2016); Mark A. Hannah & Christina
Saidy, Locating the Terms of Engagement: Shared Language Development in Secondary to
Postsecondary Writing Transitions, 66 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 120, 122 (2014); Mark A.
Hannah & Chris Lam, Patterns of Dissemination: Examining and Documenting Practitioner
Knowledge Sharing Practices on Blogs, 63 TECH. COMM. 328, 329 (2016).
77 Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173; Ivie, supra note 7, at 52.
78 Bartanen, supra note 7, at 243; Brennan, Jr., supra note 49, at 432; Bryan & Ringsmuth,
supra note 8, at 162.
79 See Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 14 PUB. CULTURE 49, 49 (2002).
80 Courtright, supra note 48, at 130.
81 See Ellen Cushman, The Rhetorician as an Agent of Social Change, 47 C. COMPOSITION &
COMM. 7, 7 (1996).
82 Warner, supra note 79, at 50.
83 Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 156.
84 Jamie R. Abrams, Reframing the Socratic Method, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 562, 562–63
(2015); Christie A. Linskens Christie, What Critiques Have Been Made of the Socratic
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often stifles dissent.85 As a result, students are left with little opportunity to imagine the role and purpose of dissent in the development of the law in general
or, more importantly, its potential influence on the development of their reasoning and writing abilities.
Ultimately, we argue that dissents are superior tools for providing law students with a vocabulary for seeing and understanding rhetoric and its complexity more broadly. While existing scholarship is useful for its description of dissents’ characteristics—in particular in its attention to foundational rhetorical
concepts such as purpose, voice, and audience—the scholarship lacks a critical
vocabulary for assessing the rhetorical nature of dissents more broadly.86 In the
next Part of this Article, we demonstrate how dissents offer legal educators
unique opportunities to introduce across the law school curriculum more complex rhetorical concepts that can heighten law students’ nascent understandings
of law’s close relationship with rhetoric.
II. RHETORIC AND ITS COMPLEXITY
To help students think beyond the genre of dissent and build a critical vocabulary for assessing rhetoric more broadly and accounting for its complexity,
we discuss in this Part unique pedagogical opportunities that dissents offer for
heightening law students’ understanding of the close connection between law
and rhetoric. In particular, we note how dissents make visible and advance
more complex understandings of four foundational rhetorical concepts: (1) the
rhetorical situation, (2) rhetorical circulation, (3) intertextuality, and (4) kairos.
Through focusing on these concepts, law students will develop an appreciation
for the essence of law’s relationality and the effect of contingency on legal
practice. That is, through studying dissents and these concepts more intentionally, law students will bear witness to how law is most properly captured in its
relations and uncertainties rather than its outputs and representations of black
letter law.87

Method in Legal Education: The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Uses, Abuses and Beyond, 12 EUR. J.L. REFORM 340, 340 (2010); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in
Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method a Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 CAL.
W. L. REV. 267, 267–68 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 115 (1999); Anthony Kronman, The Socratic Method and the
Development of the Moral Imagination, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 647, 647 (2000).
85 Christie, supra note 84, at 348; Jackson, supra note 84, at 302; Kerr, supra note 84, at
118; Kronman, supra note 84, at 649.
86 See Christie, supra note 84, at 345.
87 Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 172. Here, we draw from Belleau and Johnson’s
recognition of dissents as useful tools for emphasizing law’s processes over its outputs. For a
useful discussion about contingency in rhetoric and “the social contingency of meaning[,]”
see Paul M. Dombrowski, Challenger and the Social Contingency of Meaning: Two Lessons
for the Technical Communication Classroom, 1 TECH. COMM. Q. 73, 73 (1992).
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A. Rhetorical Situation
The concept of rhetorical situation was introduced by Lloyd Bitzer in 1968
to answer his question regarding the nature of the contexts in which speakers or
writers create rhetorical discourse.88 In response, Bitzer defined a rhetorical situation “as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an
actual or potential exigence[,] which can be completely or partially removed if
discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence.”89 Through
this definitional work, Bitzer casts rhetorical situations as bounded units or contexts that exist out there in the world waiting to be perceived by rhetors and addressed through their discourse.90
Bitzer’s work is foundational for its attempt to locate how discourse arises
to address perceived imperfections in the world,91 yet not long after its publication, Bitzer’s bounded conception was challenged for being too limited and
constraining. For example, Richard Vatz argued that rhetorical situations do not
simply exist out there waiting to be perceived but instead are created by rhetors
through the choices they make when articulating a context of events.92 Vatz’s
argument shifted agency over to the rhetor, endowing that person with a capacity to create conditions for discourse through creating rhetorical situations and
therefore freeing the rhetor from the constraints of a pre-determined, bounded
situation.
Though important for its recognition of a rhetor’s agency, Vatz’s work established a dissatisfying binary for evaluating rhetorical situations—an alreadyformed situation versus a to-be-determined situation—that rhetorical scholars
have been working earnestly to think beyond for nearly half a century. Examples of this critical work include calls to find a middle ground in the binary and
see rhetoric as an art;93 to emphasize multiplicity or the reality of multiple audiences, exigences, and constraints that influence rhetorical situations;94 to
challenge the presumptions that audiences are fully formed and unified and that
rhetorical situations are identity producing events;95 to recognize that rhetorical
situations are not a collection of single situations but instead are part of an eco88

Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1 (1968).
Id. at 6.
90 Id. at 5, 9.
91 In rhetoric and communication scholarship, Bitzer’s rhetorical situation analysis is generally the standard citation for defining this concept and is the foundation upon which subsequent theorizing builds. See infra notes 94–99 for some examples of subsequent theorization.
92 Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154, 154, 156
(1973). There is some precedent in legal scholarship for acknowledging the capacity of exp
ert writers to construct rhetorical situations. See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 61–62.
93 Scott Consigny, Rhetoric and Its Situations, 7 PHIL. & RHETORIC 175, 185 (1974).
94 Craig R. Smith & Scott Lybarger, Bitzer’s Model Reconstructed, 44 COMM. Q. 197, 197
(1996).
95 Barbara A. Biesecker, Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of
Différance, 22 PHIL. & RHETORIC 110, 110 (1989).
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logical network of exchanges and communications that bleed between and inform each other;96 and finally to acknowledge that discourse circulates through
our everyday activities and thus does not exist in one place but instead exists as
passing through and thus never located.97 Across each of these extended retheorizations of the rhetorical situation, we see increasing appreciation for the complexity and fluidity of conditions that give rise to discourse, conditions that are
potentially both constraining and generative and work across time and space
rather than bound up in a location.
With this background in mind, we are led to ask how rhetorical situations
are presented in the law school classroom via the case method. In that method,
rhetorical situations are the selected cases that arrive for students predetermined—prepackaged if you will—in a textbook. Those cases are constrained to
a particular fact pattern and application of law that led to a specific legal outcome, which the students try to discern through principles of legal reasoning. In
this scenario, students are directed to look at the case in a Bitzerian fashion, as
found.98 They are invited to think through how the exigence, the audience, and
the constraints within the case work together and lead to the eventual holding.
Admittedly, there is some connection to other rhetorical situations or cases
through discussions and acknowledgements of precedent or other historical
cases that influence the holding in a case. However, the acknowledgement of a
rhetorical situation’s complexity is tacit. Students generally work through case
history, or rhetorical situation history, and are often not prompted to consider
the range of other factors—political, social, economic, interpersonal, etc.—that
influenced the production of discourse in the case initially selected for review.
Rather, usually they are asked to distinguish cases on fine, nuanced grounds,
thus reifying the isolated conception of the Bitzerian rhetorical situation.
Dissents help law students think beyond the limits of the Bitzerian rhetorical situation before them, the case in which they are working and developing
legal discourse on behalf of a hypothetical client. Specifically, as change
agents, dissents naturally and intentionally look beyond the rhetorical situation
in which their authors’ positions have lost and seek, through discourse, to create a new rhetorical situation for their ideas to operate and thrive.99 Of note in
96

Jenny Edbauer, Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to
Rhetorical Ecologies, 35 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 5, 19 (2005).
97 Catherine Chaput, Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the
Overdetermination of Affective Energy, 43 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 20 (2010).
98 As an example, in her discussion of the schism between doctrinal and skills courses, Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione cites Bitzer as her initial scholarly source for rhetorical situation awareness. ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 43, at 83.
99 We acknowledge here that the Vatzian conception of creating rhetorical situations that we
are positing for dissent writing is not without its limits. That is, dissent authors are not entirely free to create a rhetorical situation in any way they see fit, or as Clarke Rountree described
in his keynote address at the Classical Rhetoric and Contemporary Law Symposium, you just
can’t “Vatz your way out of a situation.” See Clarke Rountree, Address at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law Symposium: Classical Rhetoric as a
Lens for Contemporary Legal Praxis (Sept. 27, 2019) (on file with author). However, we are
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the move to look beyond is how dissents restore law students’ connections with
the law’s relationality, which is severed by the Bitzerian impulse to look only
to address the motivating exigence of the pre-existing rhetorical situation. More
specifically, when thinking through the law’s relationality, students are compelled to look beyond the defined rhetorical situation at hand and assess the potential influence of other nonlegal factors, circumstances, exigences, and actors
circulating beyond it. Ultimately, in looking beyond the isolated rhetorical situation, a dissent creates the necessary discursive holding space for the dissent
and its attendant ideas to interact and grow and create the kinds of conditions
that are necessary for the corrective action called forth in the dissent to occur.
For such change to happen though, lawyers must also look beyond a newly created rhetorical situation and assess how it can work in tandem with discourse
from other situations and contexts to affect a change in the law. Such a collaborative perspective on rhetorical situations requires an ecological perspective
and a shift in many students’ rhetorical imaginations towards the movements of
rhetorical circulation.
B. Rhetorical Circulation
Generally speaking, rhetorical circulation is understood as the ways in
which texts and discourse move through time and space. More specifically, rhetorical circulation attends to the ways rhetoric moves, unanchored, through our
everyday, situated lives.100 An emphasis on movement within rhetorical circulation draws attention to the constitutive nature of rhetoric, as rhetoric being a
living environment101 in which various rhetorical situations come together and
collaborate to produce some kind of change through discourse.102 An outcome
of the continuous change spurred by rhetorical circulation is that dialogue remains open and resists closure through new articulations that are created in
communicative exchanges.103 Of note in these exchanges is that old articulations do not die off and disappear. Rather, they retain some form of discursive
energy and remain available to be drawn into future circulation and participate
drawn to Vatz’s recognition of a rhetor’s agency in creating rhetorical situations and hope
through our proposed dissent pedagogy to cultivate in students an awareness of the different
authoring roles potentially available to them as practitioners.
100 Chaput, supra note 97, at 20. Chaput also notes that circulation asks rhetors to think of
rhetoric as continuously moving through and connecting different instantiations within a
complex world. Id. at 6; see also Jason Edward Black, Native Authenticity, Rhetorical Circulation, and Neocolonial Decay: The Case of Chief Seattle’s Controversial Speech, 15
RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 635, 636 (2012). Black also notes how “fragmented discourse circulates says much about a public that interprets it and the ideologies that underscore that particular public’s civic imaginary.” Id. Black’s argument here has significant implications for
how dissents reintroduce politics into legal discourse that the legal system sought to exclude.
101 Black, supra note 100, at 636; Edbauer, supra note 96, at 13.
102 See Black, supra note 100, at 640; Chaput, supra note 97, at 6–7 (discussing Louis Althusser’s articulation of rhetoric as an overdetermined practice).
103
See Black, supra note 100, at 637.
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in the accrual and evolution of meaning over time.104 A distinctive feature of
rhetorical circulation and its influence on meaning making and knowledge production is that it operates independent of formal reasoning processes and requires no structural framework or planning for its effects to take shape.105 That
is, rhetorical circulation is an always- and already-emergent phenomenon, and
through understanding such structureless emergence, rhetors begin to appreciate that discourse cannot be bound by situations.106 By extension, rhetors also
then realize that they are not bound by situations. They realize they “are never
outside the network[] . . . of forces”107 and will therefore create the kinds of
rhetorical energy that drives rhetorical circulation through their decisionmaking.
Dissents operate on a logic of rhetorical circulation. As forward-looking,
deliberative compositions, they depend on the accrual of energy and evolution
of meaning over time to achieve the desired changes in law that they offer as
propositions for readers to consider.108 Specifically, as change agents, dissents
are connective events that work to draw in traces of legal and nonlegal texts
and discourses to create new articulations in light of their expressed proposition, the primary aim of which is to increase communicative exchanges and the
dissemination of positive affective discursive energy109 through the discursive
holding space they create. Of note for their desires to keep dialogue open via
new articulations, dissents work against the grain of law’s closed discourse system.110 That is, they draw on the structureless nature of circulation to combat
the organizing force of law, which is governed by logical ordering schema and
the principles of legal reasoning—rationality, objectivity, hierarchy, precedent,
etc.111
By developing an awareness of the opportunity for and power of working
against the grain of law’s organizing schema, law students are better able to see
that law does not exist in a location, in a box of black-letter law. Rather, the
law exists in its relations that manifest through students’ own decision-making
processes when developing and communicating a legal argument for a dissent
104

Id.
Chaput, supra note 97, at 11.
106 Id. at 8.
107 Id. at 12.
108 Campbell, III, supra note 9, at 307. Campbell acknowledges law’s transcendence, specifically, that law encompasses more than the present in its spread. Id. Put simply, law creates
surpluses that carry forward and shape future legal decision-making processes. It is this surplus from which rhetorical circulation draws its force and energy from for shaping the production of discourse across time and space. For a useful discussion of surplus, see generally
EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, AND
THE ETHICS OF BELIEF (2004); see also Francis J. Mootz, III & Leticia M. Saucedo, The
“Ethical” Surplus of the War on Illegal Immigration, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 257, 257–
58, 262 (2012).
109 Chaput, supra note 97, at 8.
110 Gibson, supra note 63, at 125.
111
See CARTER & BURKE, supra note 6, at xiv.
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or any other legal context. Rhetorical circulation invites students to witness this
existence. An extension of the heightened awareness of law’s relationality that
develops through examining rhetorical circulation in the context of dissents is
that students are encouraged to see that meaning is not tied to situations or locations but instead will develop through accrual and collaboration between situations and locations over time.112 A reversal of a majority decision, which is the
ultimate aim of the written dissent, requires a passing of time and attendant accrual. The reversal will not just appear out of nowhere. Instead it will emerge
and pop up from some nexus of circulating factors and be flavored historically
by the predominant events, ideologies, and attitudes that shaped public perceptions of the issue at hand. As such, rhetorical circulation makes clear dissents’
important roles as genres of public rhetoric that activate the kinds of change
that are necessary to realign the democratic ideals of law with present day facts
and circumstances.
C. Intertextuality
Intertextuality is a concept that describes the relationships that exist between and among texts, examples of which include connections established by
“citations, quotations, allusions, borrowings, adaptations, appropriations, parody, pastiche, imitation, and the like.”113 In this definition, it is easy to recognize
the close relationship between rhetorical circulation and intertextuality and the
overlap in the kinds of work they do. Foremost among their similarities are
their both being constitutive, relational concepts114 that establish new articulations that create changes and reshape communities.115 Intertextuality, in particular, is constitutive for the ways it reactivates a text and gives it new discursive life by connecting it to another text and drawing off or borrowing from its
ideas.116 Furthermore, intertextuality has a Vatzian quality in that it can create
its own contexts or rhetorical situations that invite readers to consider a new
perspective.117
112

See Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 488 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost].
113 Frank J. D’Angelo, The Rhetoric of Intertextuality, 29 RHETORIC REV. 31, 33 (2010).
D’Angelo discusses Julia Kristeva’s development of intertextuality as a concept in her Revolution in Poetic Language. Id.
114 See Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 156; James E. Porter, Intertextuality and the
Discourse Community, 5 RHETORIC REV. 34, 40 (1986).
115 Porter, supra note 114, at 41; see also Heinrich F. Plett, Rhetoric and Intertextuality, 17
RHETORICA 313, 325 (1999) (discussing how intertextuality alters community commonplaces
that have lost decorum or are no longer in accordance with generally acknowledged social
norms).
116 Plett, supra note 115, at 317. For a useful discussion about how law is activated via connections in the French legal system, see Mark A. Hannah, Flexible Assembly: Latour, Law,
and the Linking(s) of Composition, in THINKING WITH BRUNO LATOUR IN RHETORIC AND
COMPOSITION 219, 224–25 (Paul Lynch & Nathaniel Rivers eds., 2015).
117
D’Angelo, supra note 115, at 33.
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Despite these similarities, intertextuality is distinguishable from rhetorical
circulation in one small, but significant way: they differ in terms of the level at
which they operate. Rhetorical circulation is a macro concept attuned to discourses, texts, events, actors, ideologies, and so forth that operate outside the
scope of the immediate case at hand, whereas intertextuality is a micro concept
that explicitly functions at the local level in a specific case. More specifically,
as a micro concept, intertextuality recognizes that circulation is mediated by
localized community, disciplinary factors, or both. In law, examples of mediating factors include legal reasoning principles, precedent, court types, hierarchy,
and objectivity, to name a few.
The significance of this distinction may seem small; however, there is
something fundamental regarding the scale at which the two concepts operate.
Specifically, it is the way in which constraints function. As noted previously in
this Article, rhetorical circulation operates independent of formal reasoning
processes and requires no structural framework or planning for its effects to
take shape.118 Intertextuality, on the other hand, is highly constrained, structured work. Intertextual success is defined as having the ability to know what
can be presupposed in discourse and knowing how to borrow and link items effectively.119 Viewing success in this way casts authors as assemblers, as rhetors
who must extend their analyses of audience beyond human agents and their attitudes, ideologies, dispositions, and the like, to the community expectations
and standards that condition and predispose those agents’ day-to-day actions.120
Shifting our look to dissents with this background about intertextuality in
mind, it is clear that dissents are intentionally intertextual. They participate as a
genre of revitalization in the larger legal discourse community that is interested
in pursuing truth and meaning about a particular legal issue whose value is being questioned.121
Certain members of the legal community are searching for potential ways
to innovate the law and forward a new articulation about the topic in question.122 When composing, dissent authors assemble a range of legal and nonlegal texts and draw connections between them to shift the public imagination
regarding a new proposition for forwarding law and justice.123 The aspiration of
the dissent is to alter or change the constitution of the legal community through
intentional acts of questioning and doubting, while simultaneously affirming
the values of the rule of law.124 The desired change likely will not materialize
quickly. But the on-the-ground conditions have been modified by the dissent,
118

Chaput, supra note 97, at 6.
See Porter, supra note 114, at 34.
120 Id. at 40.
121 See sources cited supra notes 61–63.
122 Porter, supra note 114, at 38.
123 Id. at 34.
124 Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 160; Courtright, supra note 48, at 141; Frost, Rhetoric of Dissent, supra note 48, at 173.
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and though the initial change may be small and perhaps even indiscernible,
those newly emergent, on-the-ground conditions will serve as incipient infrastructure upon which activated legal and nonlegal discursive resources can be
combined to build new articulations.
As part of their intertextual character, dissents also provide useful opportunities for law students to consider the role of constraints in their writing and
reasoning processes. Constraint is arguably the key defining feature of the practice of law or what it means to think and communicate like a lawyer.125 Being
intentional about directing more attention to dissents and their intertextual nature brings the issue of constraint to the fore in a new way: not simply in terms
of the constrains inherent in the practice of law, but also in regard to the constraints of a community, its assumptions and presumptions that will determine
the success of an intertextual articulation.126 Thinking through intertextuality in
the context of dissents prompts law students to consider legal constraint and
community or social constraint as hand-in-hand or simultaneous features of argumentation. Learning how to operate freely and have some authorial control
over what discursive artifacts and traces are assembled between these different
types of constraints can be challenging for law students, and engaging dissents
can be a useful way for them to practice how to exercise such authorial control
and account for both law and societal or community norms. Put differently, dissents provide law students with opportunities to learn how to leverage intertextuality and create conditions for change by authoring both in and outside of the
law.
D. Kairos
Generally understood as the opportune moment for action, kairos is a widely discussed and foundational component of rhetorical theory.127 In fact, some
rhetorical scholars have cast kairos as rhetoric’s linchpin (i.e., “[r]hetoric is the
art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and
attempts to suggest that which is possible.”)128 The duality that operates in
kairos—identifying not only the opportune moment but also that which is possible in that moment—requires rhetors to engage in a nuanced balancing act.
They must have a capacity to discern and evaluate rhetorical factors such as
125

CARTER & BURKE, supra note 6, at 86–87; WHITE, supra note 6, at 237; Belleau & Johnson, supra note 6, at 174.
126 Porter, supra note 114, at 43.
127 See generally RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS (Phillip
Sipiora & James S. Baumlin eds., 2002); Michael Carter, Stasis and Kairos: Principles of
Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric, 7 RHETORIC REV. 97 (1988); James L. Kinneavy
& Catherine R. Eskin, Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 17 WRITTEN COMM. 432 (2000); Carolyn R. Miller, Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science, in A RHETORIC OF DOING: ESSAYS ON
WRITTEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 310 (Stephen P. Witte et al. eds.,
1992).
128 John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric, 16 PHIL. & RHETORIC 35, 36
(1983).
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audience, context, and purpose as well as more expansive influences such as
effects spread by rhetorical circulation and intertextuality. If successful in their
balancing work, rhetors will perceive an opening for action, an opening that
calls forth discourse to address a perceived imperfection in the world.
In law, perception of the opportune moment is complicated by additional
constraints operating within the legal system, ranging from legal reasoning
principles and their thrust of rationality and objectivity, to the ways that legal
roles (e.g., prosecutor vs. defense attorney), shape and precondition legal decision-making, to jurisprudential ideology (e.g., originalism and legal realism), to
who is sitting on a multi-member court that will evaluate a dissent and determine whether the time is right for a change in the law to occur.129 Balancing
these legal constraints along with the previously mentioned rhetorical and social constraints poses unique rhetorical challenges for law students in the processes of learning to think like a lawyer. Unfortunately, while in this process,
law students do not have many opportunities to practice this balancing act.
Specifically, law students are given cases to study and fact patterns to respond
to. The opportunity to determine when is an appropriate time to respond is seldom, if ever, at issue for law students. They simply respond when called upon.
Admittedly, this is a bit of an oversimplification, but in general, identifying the
opportune time or opening to respond within is not a part of the decisionmaking apparatus for law students. As such, the “when” of kairos is not obvious in legal education.
Dissents directly ask law students to respond to the question of “when” in
legal contexts, as they are created in a perceived opening created by an adverse
judgment. To act in this kairotic opening, dissent authors write to create the
discursive holding space for rhetorical circulation and intertextuality to set in.
Within this holding space, new articulations and textual relations are activated
and reactivated to generate the necessary discursive energy for circulating the
dissent conversation that has as its express aim the altering of the community
whose acceptance is necessary for realizing the proposed change in law.
Beyond asking students to respond to the general question of “when,” dissents also are useful for expanding law students’ understandings of the potential influence of kairos in legal communication. Simply put, because dissents
require time to take effect, they add a quantitative or chronos aspect of time to
kairos.130 As such, identifying the opportune moment for composing a dissent
requires a shift away from a moment to an ecological, collaborative view of
129

Berzon, supra note 61, at 1485–87; Kirby, supra note 62, at 7–8; Mijatov, supra note 63,
at 80.
130 See James S. Baumlin & Tita French Baumlin, Chronos, Kairos, Aion: Failures of Decorum, Right-Timing, and Revenge in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS:
ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 165–66, 175, 179 (2002); Ashley Rose Kelly et
al., Considering Chronos and Kairos in Digital Media Rhetorics, in DIGITAL RHETORIC AND
GLOBAL LITERACIES: COMMUNICATION MODES AND DIGITAL PRACTICES IN THE NETWORKED
WORLD 229–31 (2014).
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multiple kairotic moments as accumulating and accruing through time. In this
ecology, such moments circulate and work together to create the kairotic opening for the dissent’s ultimate success in achieving the change in the law the dissent initially set forth propositionally.
Deciphering what has made this opening the opportune and appropriate
moment requires judgment informed by notions of rhetorical circulation and
intertextuality. Such judgment sifts and sorts through history, events, ideologies, attitudes, and the like that circulate in the macro context of the dissent issue. Furthermore, such judgment evaluates the competing yet mutually informing dimensions of the issue, e.g. the political, social, economic, institutional,
religious, that create multiple discursive traces that animate discourse about the
issue in question. Such judgment requires patience and flexibility to identify
and assess a range of circulating factors that inform on the decision to write or
not to write.131
Ultimately, studying dissents leads us to ask: When is the right time to dissent? What is the appropriate opening for dissent? What is possible to achieve
with the dissent? Or, asked together, is now a time in which there is a favorable, wider context for accepting the dissenting argument? Encouraging students
to think critically about these questions and seek answers in a collaborative
fashion with the professor will help students develop the kind of kairotic judgment that is essential to the contemporary practice of law.
III. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DOCTRINAL CLASSROOM
Most doctrinal professors already have students read and discuss dissents,
particularly those dissents that advance arguments or theories that ultimately
became law.132 Seldom, if ever, however, do professors in doctrinal classrooms
explicitly discuss the dissents in terms of the rhetorical principles they might
employ or illustrate. Although creative professors could devise various imaginative approaches to introducing advanced rhetorical concepts by using dissents in the doctrinal classroom, this paper offers two suggestions: having the
students draft a dissent to one of the cases discussed in class or assigning supplemental and nonlegal readings along with a dissent to support an in-class discussion of the relevant rhetorical concepts. And, although professors could introduce various different advanced rhetorical concepts using these approaches,
this paper focuses on four: the rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos. Each approach involves three main steps: selecting the
dissent, identifying content for pre-class preparation, and designing an in-class
activity or out-of-class assignment (or both).

131

The implementation sections of this article offer examples of cases like Delling v. Idaho
to illustrate the challenge of balancing considerations of kairos and chronos when working to
identify the opportune moment for writing a dissent.
132
Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 893–94; see also Levine & Saunders, supra note 1, at 108.
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Assigning students to write a short dissent to one of the cases discussed in
class may be attractive for a few reasons. First, it advances the goal of incorporating writing across the law school curriculum133 without requiring the professor to devise a complicated hypothetical or simulate real-life law practice and
without requiring the students to conduct outside research. If the professor imposes a short enough word count, reading and providing brief feedback on the
assignments should not pose a significant burden, and the professor could even
delegate that effort to teaching assistants or fellows. Second, it requires students to engage with the cases and legal concepts in a way that encourages
them to identify and question potentially faulty assumptions on which a line of
legal reasoning is based. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it allows many
students to reclaim the knowledge, experiences, and values they brought with
them to law school, which law school often encourages students to stifle in order to better exercise the dispassionate reasoning “required” to “think like a
lawyer” and “discover” the “true law.”134
Selecting the case probably presents the greatest challenge. The ideal case
or cases would present opportunities for the students to consider other texts that
might inform or influence the decision and the cultural, political, and jurisprudential climate in which the decision was written or in which the central legal
dispute arose. The optimal case would also enable students to trace thoughts
and ideas through various texts, including briefs from the parties or amici,
through to the dissent. In selecting the case, the professor has three primary options: to assign all students the same case, to assign individual students different cases, or to allow the students to select a case from among the ones covered
in course readings and class discussion. Assigning all the students the same
case has some advantages. The professor can better compare student papers to
one another. The professor can focus in-class discussion around the single case.
The professor has richer options in identifying content for pre-class preparation
and can require students to read or view some of the materials that could inform
student understanding of how the advanced rhetorical concepts come into play.
Perhaps most significantly, selecting a single case makes it easier for the professor to ensure that the case presents ample opportunities to explore the key
rhetorical concepts the professor wishes to cover. On the other hand, assigning
individual students different cases relieves some of the monotony of reading
papers on the same topic. Although allowing students to choose their own cases
makes it significantly more difficult to ensure that the cases facilitate the objectives of the exercise, it has the advantage of enabling students to respond to a
case or issue that provokes strong feelings or opinions in them.
133

See Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing-Across-the-Law-School Curriculum: Theoretical Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 73, 99 (2004) (proposing that a “comprehensive writing-across-the-curriculum
program in the law school context . . . offers a solution[]” to improving student writing and
educating competent new lawyers).
134
See Berger, Studying, supra note 7, at 63–64 (emphasis added).
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Content for pre-class preparation could include something as simple as
having the students read short descriptions of the rhetorical situation, circulation, intertextuality, and kairos from texts on rhetoric or even from web sources
like Wikipedia.135 If the professor assigns a single case or a limited selection of
cases, the professor should also assign texts that help to put that case or those
cases in a cultural, political, social, and jurisprudential context. Texts could include news articles or opinion pieces, artistic pieces like short stories, film
clips, or selections from novels, or even print or television advertisements or
public-service announcements, along with excerpts from the parties’ briefs and
any influential amicus briefs.
The in-class activity could begin with a brief discussion of the rhetorical
concepts at issue and how they might affect a dissent. The professor could use
the key case to guide students through identifying the exigence, the audience,
and the constraints. The professor could then invite students to talk about the
ideas, texts, and arguments covered in the assigned reading that might cause an
author to frame the legal analysis differently and support or justify a different
outcome. Then, after and informed by this class discussion, the students would
write a short dissent outside of class, focusing less on case law and more on
challenging the majority opinion through arguments shaped and informed by
the rhetorical concepts at play.
Alternatively, a professor might teach these advanced rhetorical concepts
by assigning supplemental and nonlegal readings along with a dissent to support an in-class discussion of those concepts. Along with the dissent, the professor could assign newspaper articles or opinion pieces that shed light on the
social, political, and cultural environment in which the case was decided or in
which the law being challenged arose, or texts that otherwise inform the dissent
or a reader’s understanding of the dissent. The professor could also assign excerpts from relevant briefings in the case, including any influential amicus
briefs.
For example, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Miranda v. Arizona136 asserts concerns about increased crime, criminals escaping justice, and depriving law enforcement of essential tools—all themes prevalent in popular culture and media
in the ensuing years.137 A professor having students read the majority opinion
and dissent in Miranda v. Arizona might also have students watch portions of
the movie Dirty Harry or urban dystopian melodramas like 1972’s original
135

See, e.g., Intertextuality, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intertextuality [ht
tps://perma.cc/ACV3-WA9D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Kairos, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https
://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kairos [https://perma.cc/XK3H-78FP] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020);
Rhetorical Circulation, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhetorical_circulation
[https://perma.cc/Z8WC-46SB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Rhetorical Situation, WIKIPED
IA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhetorical_situation [https://perma.cc/9YKP-WK77]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
136 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504–24 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 517, 524.
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Death Wish.138 Students could also read news articles about the ballooning of
the U.S. crime rate in the 1970s, about Richard Nixon’s “War on Crime” and
how Nixon used fear of crime to his political advantage, and about local news’s
overwhelming shift in focus from public-affairs journalism to sensationalist
scene-of-the-crime “breaking news,” even after the crime rate began to fall in
the 1990s.139
Alternatively, a professor teaching antitrust law or sports law could have
the students read Justice Marshall’s dissent in Flood v. Kuhn,140 the decision
that upheld Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption. In his dissent, Justice
Marshall compared baseball’s reserve clause to involuntary servitude.141 Along
with the dissent, the professor could assign selections from books and articles
about the reserve-clause controversy or about racial issues in baseball and in
sports in general in the middle of the twentieth century, or even poetic pieces
waxing lyrical about America’s “national pastime” (as indeed Justice
Blackmun waxed in his majority opinion).142
138

I now realize that my law school “Film and the Law” class taught by the incomparable
Professor Terry K. Diggs, was implicitly about rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and
kairos.
139 See, e.g., Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on
Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination,
15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–16 (2013) (discussing the rise of “tough on
crime” politics in the late 1960s and 1970s); Law and Order (Politics), WIKIPEDIA.COM,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_order_(politics) [https://perma.cc/WT2Z-2XQZ]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2020) (discussing Richard Nixon’s “law and order” campaign in the
1968 election); Jeremy Lipschultz, The Origins of Crime News on TV, OXFORD RES.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY (Apr. 2017), https://oxfordre.com/criminology/view/10.109
3/acrefore/9780190264079.001.0001/acrefore-9780190264079-e-57 [https://perma.cc/T3SRXC9K] (“In the United States in the 1970s, local ‘action news’ formats, driven by live
broadcast technologies and consultant recommendations designed to improve ratings,
changed the nature of television news. Specifically, industry watchers perceived a shift from
public affairs journalism about politics, issues, and government toward an emphasis on profitable live, breaking news from the scene of the crime.”); Yeoman Lowbrow, Alarmed and
Dangerous: A Look at Crime in 1970s–80s America, FLASHBAK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://fla
shbak.com/alarmed-and-dangerous-a-look-at-crime-in-1970s-80s-america-25282/
[https://perma.cc/74SJ-BKW3] (describing the perception of rampant crime in the 1970s and
detailing some of the manifestations of that obsession in popular culture); Terence McArdle,
The ‘Law and Order’ Campaign that Won Richard Nixon the White House 50 Years Ago,
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/05/law-ordercampaign-that-won-richard-nixon-white-house-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/M999-FMDE];
Barbara Millhausen, 1968 Nixon Law and Order, YOUTUBE (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=cEdtwQ8OguY [https://perma.cc/K68P-6CJN] (video of television ad
for Nixon in 1968 campaign); Richard Nixon Campaign ’68, APM REPORTS, https://feat
ures.apmreports.org/arw/campaign68/b1.html [https://perma.cc/57V5-L337] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2020).
140 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 288 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 289.
142 Id. at 264; see also BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD’S FIGHT FOR FREE
AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 130–31 (2006); Mary Craig, Chained to the Game: Professional Baseball and the Reserve Clause, Part Two, SBNATION (June 10, 2017, 1:00 PM),
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Or a professor teaching the insanity defense in criminal law could have
students read the dissent to the denial of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho,143 a case
involving a state statute essentially abolishing the traditional insanity defense.144 In the wake of the Hinckley verdict in 1982,145 a number of states enacted similar statutes narrowing the insanity defense, shifting the burden of
proof, or abolishing the defense outright and instead requiring defendants to assert that their mental illnesses deprived them of the requisite mens rea for the
underlying offenses.146 In his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Delling, Justice Breyer makes a point about culpability through a hypothetical comparing a
murder defendant who asserts that he is not responsible because he believed his
human victim was a wolf, on the one hand, with a murder defendant who asserts that he is not responsible because he believed that a wolf ordered him to
commit the crime, on the other.147 The Breyer dissent went on to be cited in the
briefing and the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in another case, State v.
Kahler,148 involving another state statute essentially abolishing the traditional
insanity defense,149 and in the briefing when the Supreme Court of the United
States granted certiorari in 2019.150 During the SCOTUS oral arguments, Jus-

https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2017/6/10/15766702/curt-flood-mlbpa-reserve-clausefree-agency [https://perma.cc/8FZS-U4Y2]; Allen Pusey, June 19, 1972: Curt Flood Loses
‘Reserve Clause’ Challenge, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2018, 12:35 AM), http://www.abajourna
l.com/magazine/article/curt_flood_loses_reserve_clause_challenge [https://perma.cc/UT59KTM9] (recounting the background of the Flood case).
143 Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 1039 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144 Id.
145 In 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate Ronald Reagan, then the President of the United States. See United States v. Hinckley, 407 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251 (D.D.C.
2005); United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1981). At the resulting
criminal trial, Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined to a psychiatric hospital instead of prison. Hinckley, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
146 Public outrage in the wake of the verdict led to calls to abolish the insanity defense altogether. See Kimberly Collins et al., The John Hinckley Trial & Its Effect on the Insanity Defense, UMKC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hinckley/hinckleyinsanity.htm
[https://perma.cc/8WCC-DFQ4] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Judi Hasson, Hinckley Verdict
Backlash Decried, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Oct. 27, 1982), https://www.upi.com/Archives
/1982/10/27/Hinckley-verdict-backlash-decried/3724404539200/ [https://perma.cc/2ST4-PV
2P]; Natalie Jacewicz, After Hinckley, States Tightened Use of the Insanity Plea, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (July 28, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/4
86607183/after-hinckley-states-tightened-use-of-the-insanity-plea [https://perma.cc/24NH-3
XP2].
147 Delling, 568 U.S. at 1040 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148 State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018).
149 Id.
150 Brief for Petitioner at 41–42, Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.) (No. 186135).
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tice Breyer even posed the same hypothetical to the attorney for the State of
Kansas, changing the wolf in both parts of the hypothetical to a dog.151
A professor using Delling would assign the usual background reading on
the key rhetorical concepts, along with the Delling dissent, portions of the
briefing in Kahler at the Kansas Supreme Court level, portions of the majority
opinion from the Kansas Supreme Court in Kahler, portions of the briefing before SCOTUS in Kahler, and key portions of the SCOTUS oral argument transcript (notably the colloquy between Breyer and the attorney for the State of
Kansas). Along with these legal readings, the professor could assign articles on
the John Hinckley trial and the public reaction to the verdict as well as the legislative response.152 Finally, in light of Breyer’s curious choice of hypothetical,
and particularly the shift from wolf to dog between the written dissent and the
oral-argument colloquy, a professor should strongly consider assigning readings on the Son of Sam crimes, David Berkowitz’s initial assertion that a demon—speaking through his neighbor Sam’s dog, “Harvey”—ordered him to
commit those crimes, and Berkowitz’s subsequent recantation of that story.153
In class, the professor could then lead a discussion—or moderate smallgroup discussions—of how an understanding of the advanced rhetorical concepts might deepen an understanding of the dissent itself and the area of law in
general, and how rhetorical concepts explain why an argument that is the dissent in one case may become the majority opinion in a later era. After the class
discussion, the professor could then assign a short, low-stakes reaction paper
encouraging the students to reflect on how these outside readings and explicit
considerations of the rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality,
and kairos might deepen their understanding of the dissent and how they might
apply these tools to their reading of other cases in the future.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE LEGAL WRITING CLASSROOM
In the first semester of a first-year legal writing, research, and analysis
(LRA) course, most schools teach the building blocks of legal writing and
151

Transcript of Oral argument at 38–40, Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.)
(No. 18-6135). Interestingly, the attorney for the State of Kansas did not seem to have a
well-prepared response to the hypothetical. See id. at 40.
152 See, e.g., Hasson, supra note 146; Jacewicz, supra note 146; Douglas O. Linder, John
Hinckley, Jr. Trial (1982), FAMOUS TRIALS https://famous-trials.com/johnhinckley [htt
ps://perma.cc/K2X3-YXKF] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
153 See, e.g., David Abrahamson, Unmasking Ion of Sam’s’, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 1979),
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/01/archives/unmasking-son-of-sams-demons.html [https
://perma.cc/2DWJ-DLFX]; Eugene S. Robinson, Meet the Serial Killer Who Took His Orders from a Demon Dog, OZY (May 15, 2018), https://www.ozy.com/flashback/meet-theserial-killer-who-took-his-orders-from-a-demon-dog/86398/ [https://perma.cc/P28L-HXQ8];
David Berkowitz, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Berkowitz [https://
perma.cc/Z66C-GHHW] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); The “Son of Sam” Trial: 1978,
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/law-magazines/son-sam-trial-1978
[https://perma.cc/32DU-3B7D] (last updated Feb. 8, 2020).
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analysis—the organizational paradigm, synthesizing a rule from multiple
sources, and using case illustrations to explain how a legal rule operates in
practice—through some form of predictive legal writing.154 In teaching rule
synthesis in that first semester, professors often struggle to get new law students to move beyond simply quoting the rule a court states in deciding a case
and read the case more closely and critically to identify the perhaps-morenuanced rule that courts are actually applying in a certain area of law.155 To do
this, students must be able to identify the dispositive facts—the facts that a
court relies on in reaching a particular resolution.156
In the second semester, many if not most students have mastered reading
cases to identify the key dispositive facts and analyzing how they affect the
outcome and inform the overall legal rule.157 Students may still struggle,
though, to identify opportunities for analogical argument when no cases seem
to address their facts or situation squarely.158 And even students who show
greater aptitude for making analogies do not always recognize larger patterns in
case law or common assumptions or narratives that run through different areas
of the law.159 The next step, then, is encouraging students to read cases at an
even deeper level to identify the undercurrents and thematic threads that allow
lawyers to make creative, persuasive, and even world-changing legal arguments
that remain tied to precedent, even where precedent seemingly on point is missing, unhelpful, or adverse. Explicitly teaching this handful of advanced rhetorical concepts in the legal writing classroom can arm students with the vocabulary to see a case as more than a vessel for holding, facts, and reasoning and
allow them to identify patterns, analogies, and strategies for making more sophisticated and compelling legal arguments.
An LRA professor might use a dissent to introduce these advanced rhetorical concepts by having the students read and analyze a short dissent and then
engage in a class discussion regarding the rhetorical concepts and how they
154

ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE 2017–2018
INSTITUTIONAL SURVEY 25 (2017–18).
155 See Fajans & Falk, supra note 21, at 163–64 (students are “seduced by the text[,]” and
“fail to see how another author ‘worked’ the text on them.”).
156 Greenhaw, supra note 10, at 883 (“A . . . lawyer needs to be able to discern the facts . . .
to which a legally authoritative writing responded. Only then can the lawyer critically evaluate it as a resource in the situation presented for analysis and give it the weight it deserves in
his or her composition.”).
157 See Stephanie Roberts Hartung & Shailini Jandial George, Promoting In-Depth Analysis:
A Three-Part Approach to Teaching Analogical Reasoning to Novice Legal Writers, 39
CUMB. L. REV. 685, 686 n.7 (2009).
158 See id. at 686 (“While students are generally able to compare facts from precedent cases
to their own set of facts, using these comparisons to effectively support a legal argument is a
far more elusive skill.”); Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note 112, at 535 (“Weak and/or incomplete analogies are most common among novice legal writers who struggle, without adequate foundation, to mimic analogy within deduction.”).
159 See Fajans and Falk, supra note 21, at 163 (“Even the best and brightest students too often scan judicial opinions for issue, holding, and reasoning and call that ‘reading.’ ”).
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manifest in that dissent. Outside of class, the students could then apply this
analysis to one of their major writing assignments and write a short, low-stakes
paper analyzing those concepts in the context of that assignment and reflecting
on how those concepts might influence how they approach the assignment. The
ideal time to conduct this exercise would be after the students have become familiar with the facts and law at issue in the major writing assignment so that
they can more readily see how the rhetorical concepts that manifest in the dissent might also manifest in their major writing assignments.
In selecting the dissent, like the professor in the doctrinal classroom, the
LRA professor should select one that presents opportunities to talk about rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos.160 Short dissents are ideal because
they allow the professor the time in class to walk the students through a close,
critical reading of the dissent with the rhetorical concepts in mind. The professor should also give some thought to how the concepts might come into play in
the major writing assignment, or even design the major writing assignment
around opportunities to discuss those concepts.
To prepare for class, students should read short selections describing the
four advanced rhetorical concepts.161 In addition, just as in the doctrinal classroom, the professor would also assign some legal—or more likely nonlegal—
texts that arm the students to recognize the arguments, assumptions, and ideas
circulating in the culture at the time of the opinion that also pop up in the dissent.
In class, then, the LRA professor can either lead the entire class through a
critical reading of the dissent to identify the rhetorical concepts at play and the
texts or ideas that pop up, or she can moderate smaller-group discussions. The
professor might even assign the groups to jointly draft a short rhetorical analysis of the dissent in class.
After discussing the concepts in class and exploring them through a close
reading of the dissent, outside of class, the students would then turn to exploring those concepts in the context of one of their major legal writing assignments, such as a trial or appellate brief. The professor would assign students a
short, low-stakes writing assignment where the students would explore the advanced rhetorical concepts at play. The students would first identify the components of the rhetorical situation for their briefs—the exigence, the audience,
and the constraints, including an analysis of the artistic and inartistic proofs on
which the students as rhetors will rely. The students would also identify ideas,
assumptions, and texts that pop up in the case law and reflect the cultural and
political contexts in which the relevant law arose and how changes to that context might change which arguments and strategies work best before different
courts at different times.
160

Presumably every case presents the opportunity to discuss the rhetorical situation.
A professor who plans to use a similar assignment year after year might create a short
video lecture introducing the concepts.
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Conducting this exercise when the students are thoroughly familiar with
the facts and law at issue, but before they have written a full first draft of their
legal argument, may help the students engage with the legal texts on a deeper
and ultimately more effective level by encouraging them to recognize the implicit assumptions and reasoning as well as the explicit facts, rationale, and
holding. The exercise may also help the students formulate legal arguments that
are ultimately deeper, more accurate, and more compelling.
LRA professors should also seriously consider explicitly teaching students
how to cite and discuss dissents effectively in written legal advocacy. If, indeed, many dissents ultimately become law—or at least influence the shape of
the law in some way—certainly the wise advocate should be skilled in writing
about them and using them as persuasive tools. One method for approaching
this nicely dovetails with some practical research instruction: An LRA professor could select one of the well-known influential dissents—like Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,162 Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v.
United States,163 or Justice Stone’s dissent in Minersville School District v. Gobitis164—and then have the students use law-updating tools on legal research
software to identify briefs that cite that dissent and trace the dissent’s influence
through the ultimate court opinion. Once the students settle on briefs and opinions to analyze, they could write a short paper analyzing the rhetorical situation
and the techniques the brief writers used to deploy the dissent to their advantage. The students could also reflect on kairos—considering both why the
dissent’s reasoning, which did not hold sway in the original opinion, was better
timed when reasserted later, and why it was effective where and how it was
used in a given brief. Of course, this exercise requires the LRA professor to do
significant research and legwork at the outset to identify briefs that seem to use
the dissent effectively and opinions influenced by the dissent, but it could be a
powerful teaching tool and, of course, a way to explicitly explore rhetorical situations, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos.
V. DISSENT IMPLICATIONS
Using dissents as a pedagogical tool for introducing law students to the
complex rhetorical concepts of rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos has tremendous implications for legal education and for
heightening law students’ understanding of the close relationship between law
and rhetoric. Most notable among these implications is that thinking through
the constitutive capacity of these rhetorical concepts positions law students to
see and understand how meaning making and knowledge creation in law are
not processes far removed from their lives. Instead they are processes available
at their hands and ready to be leveraged to support both the kinds of work they
162
163
164

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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want to perform as lawyers and the kinds of lives and identities they want to
cultivate as professionals. Also, thinking about the connection between law and
rhetoric in ways discussed in this Article raises important questions regarding
the training of lawyers for the contemporary practice of law.
First, we are interested in imagining lawyers as public citizens, individuals
not just engaged in the traditional practice of law.165 Using dissent and rhetoric
principles, can we shift law students’ imaginations about what it means to take
on responsibilities of both client advocacy and public citizenship? What are the
implications to legal writing pedagogy of teaching law students not just to write
for the law but for social change? Is it appropriate to teach them to write for social change?
Second, dissents expand understandings of lawyers as authors. Dissent
pedagogy demonstrates that lawyers have authoring potential beyond just developing arguments in support of a client’s case. They are authors of rhetorical
situations and of new intertextual articulations that create conditions for innovating on the law. Ultimately, can broadening notions of authoring provide
lawyers with agency and enable them to envision themselves as more than just
passive conduits of predetermined outcomes?
Third, so much controversy in law today is about the role of values in argumentation.166 However, “[e]xpressing the law is inescapably a process
shaped by values.”167 Is it possible through dissent pedagogy to slow the exclusion of values that law’s systematicity enacts and help students account for and
embrace the rhetorical potential of values in legal argumentation?
Fourth, as we move the meter toward public citizenship, new authoring
roles, and values, can we more intentionally address lawyer well-being? Do nuanced understandings of rhetorical situation, rhetorical circulation, intertextuality, and kairos developed through dissent pedagogy help students identify
new pathways for cultivating more autonomy and developing sustainable connections between their professional and personal lives?
Explicitly addressing questions like these will help law students become
better strategic thinkers and help them see their writing in a larger context of a
case, of a litigation strategy, or of a larger movement of social change. Furthermore, framing legal discourse in terms of the discussed complex rhetorical
concepts might make it easier to have the difficult, inevitably political, and
sometimes emotional conversations that arise when law is placed in the larger
context in a less charged, safer way.
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For a discussion of the concept of lawyer as public citizen, see Robert W. Gordon, The
Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2009); Irma S. Russell, The Lawyer as Public Citizen: Meeting
the Pro Bono Challenge, 72 UMKC L. REV. 439, 439 (2003); Robert E. Scott, The Lawyer
as Public Citizen, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2000).
166 For example, there is much criticism of originalism’s attempt to keep values out of legal
argumentation and decision-making. See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 3 (2018).
167
Kirby, supra note 62, at 5; see also SEGALL, supra note 166, at 3.
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Admittedly, the prospect of adding complex rhetorical concepts to law
school curriculum may seem daunting. However, law faculty are already there.
They are actively working to integrate rhetoric and note its relevance to law.168
This Article presents dissent pedagogy as a kairotic opening before faculty. It is
time to act in that opening and rearticulate dissent pedagogy as a necessary
complement to the training of lawyers for the contemporary practice of law,
which necessarily engages law, rhetoric, and politics.

168

See sources cited supra notes 10, 21, 23, and 25–26.

